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REQUIEM FOR ROTH: OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
IS CHANGING
David E. Engdahl*
I.

HARK! THE REQUIEM

1957, the Supreme Court decided Roth v. United States and
Alberts v. California/ and thereby commenced what has proved
to be one of the most perplexing and politically sensitive tasks the
Court has ever undertaken2-determining the constitutional limitations on the power of state and federal governments to regulate
obscenity. After twelve years of decisions in the obscenity field, the
regrettable truth is that "no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by [the] Court."3 The unreconciled conflicts among the several opinions of Supreme Court Justices ·written
since 1957, and the new uncertainties created by the substantial
changes in the personnel of the Court, make it difficult, if not impossible, to extract controlling principles from the obscenity cases. But
in the cacophony which now prevails, a careful ear can pick out the
opening strains of a developing theme-a theme which is quite different from that played in the most noted opinions in the cases decided since Roth v. United States. The symphony which seems to be
emerging is a requiem for Roth.
The fundamental holding of Roth was that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." 4 A
bare majority of five Justices joined in the Court's opinion in that
case, and only one of those Justices is still on the Court.5 Chief
Justice Warren concurred in the result on narrower grounds; 6 Justice Harlan rejected the reasoning of the Court's opinion, although

I
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• Associate Professor and Director, The Law Revision Center, University of Colorado School of Law; Member of the Michigan Bar. A.B. 1961, LL.B. 1964, University
of Kansas; S.J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. The obscenity decisions undoubtedly have aggravated the strong tensions surrounding the Supreme Court as an institution. This fact is clearly demonstrated by the
congressional clamor over Justice Fortas' obscenity opinions during the hearings on
his nomination for Chief Justice.
3. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a '\\Toman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) Gustice Harlan, dissenting) [hereinafter Memoirs v. Massachusetts].
4. 354 U.S. at 485.
5. The majority in Roth consisted of Justices Brennan, Burton, Clark, Frankfurter,
and Whittaker.
6. 354 U.S. at 495-96. Chief Justice Warren's opinion is quoted in the text accompanying note 46 infra.
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he partially concurred in the result; and Justices Black and Douglas
joined in a spirited dissent. In the years since Roth, those Justices
who opposed the decision at the outset have not retreated from their
positions, while the supporters of the Roth rationale on the Court
have dwindled and have fallen into disagreement among themselves
over its subsequent application.

A. The Present Cacophony
It will be well, before proceeding to assess the current vitalityor morbidity-of the Roth rationale, to fix in mind the several conflicting doctrines which certain members of the Supreme Court still
maintain.
The view which Justice Douglas holds toward the suppression of
obscenity was expressed in his dissenting opinion in Roth. In that
dissent, he admitted that "[f]reedom of expression can be suppressed
if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action
as to be an inseparable part of it"; 7 indeed, he insisted that "[a]s a people, we cannot afford to relax that standard.'' 8 But he observed, referring to the scientific evidence, that "it is by no means clear that
obscene literature ... is a significant factor in influencing substantial
deviations from the community standards.''9 He concluded that
"[t]he absence of dependable information on the effect of obscene
literature on human conduct should make us wary. It should put us
on the side of protecting society's interest in literature, except and
unless it can be said that the particular publication has an impact on
actions that the government can control." 10 Justice Douglas flatly
rejected the majority's ipse dixit that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press," and said, "I would
give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full support. I have
the same confidence in the ability of our people to reject noxious
literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the
false in theology, economics, politics, or any other field." 11 In the
cases decided since Roth, Justice Douglas has not softened his
position. In A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts (Memoirs v. Massachusetts),12 he reiterated his view "that the First Amendment does
7. 354 U.S. at 514.
8. 354 U.S. at 514.
9. 354 U.S. at 510.
IO. 354 U.S. at 511.
ll. 354 U.S. at 514.
12. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

December 1969]

Requiem for Roth

187

not permit the censorship of expression not brigaded with illegal
action." 13 He declared that "[t]he Court's contrary conclusion in
Roth, where obscenity was found to be 'outside' the First Amendment, is without justification."14 If there has been any change in
Douglas' view, the change has been toward greater adamancy. In
Ginzburg v. United States,1 5 he wrote in dissent:
[I]he First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed-whether
orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. . . . The theory is that
people are mature enough to pick and choose, to recognize trash
when they see it, to be attracted to the literature that satisfies their
deepest need, and hopefully, to move from plateau to plateau
to finally reach the world of enduring ideas.
I think this is the ideal of the Free Society written into our Constitution.... It is shocking to me for us to send to prison anyone
for publishing anything, especially tracts so distant from any incitement to action as the ones before us.1 6

Justice Douglas continues to insist that identical restraints on
governmental suppression are imposed by the first amendment upon
the national government and, by the incorporation of the first
amendment into the fourteenth, upon the states. Until those restraints are relaxed by constitutional amendment, he maintains, obscenity can be suppressed by any level of government no more
readily than any other expression that is not demonstrably and sufficiently related to illegal action.17
Justice Black concurred in Douglas' dissent in Roth, and has
also concurred in some of Douglas' subsequent obscenity opinions.18
In the opinions which Justice Black himself has written on the subject, he has confirmed his conviction that "the Roth case was wrongly
decided." 19 Obscenity censorship laws are, he contends, "in plain
violation of the unequivocal prohibition . . . against 'abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.' " 20 He stated in Ginzburg that
"the Federal Government is without any power whatever under
the Constitution to put any type of burden on speech and expresIll. 383 U.S. at 426.
14. 383 U.S. at 428.
15. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
16. 383 U.S. at 491-92.
17. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650-71 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
18. E.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 703 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968).
19. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964) (concurring opinion).
20. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964) (concurring opinion).
See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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sion of ideas of any kind (as distinguished from conduct) ... .''21 And
since, in Black's view, the first amendment is made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, the states, too, have "vast
power to regulate conduct but no power at all . . . to make the expression of views a crime.''22
While Black and Douglas have never softened their stand,
however, they have not been successful in persuading their colleagues
on the Court to adopt their views. Of the Justices who are currently
sitting on the Court, none but Black and Douglas themselves has ever
endorsed their view.
Justice Harlan's position, to which he has consistently adhered
since propounding it in his dissent in Roth,23 is more complex than
that shared by Douglas and Black. In the first place, Harlan rejects, as he always has, the doctrine that the fourteenth amendment
incorporates, in any literal sense, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights. 24 Rather, he insists that the restraints imposed on the federal
government by the first amendment may differ substantially from
those imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment. In
Harlan's view, "[f]ederal suppression of allegedly obscene matter
should ... be constitutionally limited to that often described as 'hardcore pornography.' " 25 He does not attempt to justify even this degree of federal censorship in terms of standards which are applicable
to other categories of speech; he merely notes offhandedly that "[t]he
Federal Government may be conceded a limited interest in excluding
from the mails such gross pornography, almost universally condemned in this country." 26
But while tolerating federal censorship only of "hard-core pornography," Harlan would apply a different standard to the states
under the fourteenth amendment. He has described that standard
21. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
22. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (dissenting opinion). See also
cases cited note 20 supra.
23. 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (1957). See Ginsberg v. New York, and Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 629, 676, at 704-11 (1968) (concurring in the former
and dissenting in the latter); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967) (separate opinion);
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (concurring opinion); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455-60 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
24. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (concurring opinion).
25. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Ginz•
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (dissenting opinion). For the definition
of "hard-core pornography," Justice Harlan refers to Justice Stewart's description in
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
26. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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in varying terms in his different opinions. In his concurring opinion
in Alberts v. California, 27 Harlan ·wrote:
We can inquire only whether the state action so subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause that it cannot be
sustained as a rational exercise of power.... The States' power to
make printed words criminal is, of course, confined by the Fourteenth Amendment, but only insofar as such power is inconsistent
with our concepts of "ordered liberty." 28

Having found that the California legislature had judged, notwithstanding the conflict of scientific evidence, that printed words can
deprave or corrupt one who reads them, Harlan determined "that
it is not irrational, in our present state of knowledge, to consider
that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state
may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society."29 Moreover,
Harlan found that, besides the prevention of illegal behavior, there
were other interests which might be protected by a state prohibition
of obscene materials, and that those interests were within the proper
cognizance of state regulation.30 He therefore concluded: "I cannot
say that the suppression [of such materials] would so interfere with
the communication of 'ideas' in any proper sense of that term that
it would offend the Due Process Clause."31 In his dissenting opinion
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, Harlan stated: "As to the states, I would make
the federal test one of rationality."32 Explaining further, he said
that he "would not prohibit [the states] ... from banning any material which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state
judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive
manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such material."33 Later, dissenting in .Memoirs v. Massachusetts, he said,
"From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a
State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted
notion of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step
27. Alberts was decided with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Harlan
concurred in the judgment in Alberts although he dissented from the judgment in
Roth.
28. 354 U.S. at 501. In support of his conclusion, Justice Harlan cited Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324·25 (1937).
29. 354 U.S. at 501-02.
30. 354 U.S. at 502.
31. 354 U.S. at 503.
32. 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964).
33. 378 U.S. at 204.
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with current American standards."34 More recently, he has said that
he "would withhold the federal judicial hand from interfering with
state determinations except in instances where the state action clearly
appears to be but the product of prudish overzealousness."35
Harlan, however, has been no more successful than Black and
Douglas have been in persuading other Justices to accept his point
of view: On their face, the cases claim continuing loyalty to Roth.
Whether that seeming loyalty is anything more than superficial is
the question which must now be answered.

B. The Emergent Symphony
I. Roth and Its Progeny
Having held iQ. Roth that "obscenity" is excluded from constitutional protection, the Court was faced with the task of defining that
term. In Roth, the Court ventured the following definition: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest.''36 To make the standard more precise, the
Court adopted the following formulation of the test: "[W]hether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest.''37 Justice Brennan, who wrote the Court's opinion in Roth,
has taken the lead in developing obscenity doctrine in the subsequent cases. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 38 Brennan translated the test of the
utter lack of "redeeming social importance," language which in Roth
had seemed merely descriptive of obscenity,39 into a test of obscenity vel non. He stated in Jacobellis: "obscenity is excluded from the
constitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without redeeming social importance' . . . . It follows that material dealing with
sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . . or that has literary or
scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance,
may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional
protection.''40 Brennan further insisted in Jacobellis that the "contemporary community standards" aspect of the Roth test contem34. 383 U .s. 413, 458 (1966).
35. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 708 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
36. 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
37. 354 U.S. at 489.
38. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
39. See 354 U.S. at 484.
40. 378 U.S. at 191.
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plated national, rather than local, community standarcls.41 Only
Justice Goldberg was willing to endorse Brennan's opinion in
Jacobellis, although four other members of the Court concurred
with the result in separate opinions.42 Finally, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,43 Justice Brennan again announced the judgment of the
Court, and delivered an opinion in which he said that under the
definition of obscenity established in Roth,
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it
must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.44
On the same day on which he delivered his Memoirs opinion,
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in Ginzburg v. United
States,4 15 which drew its inspiration from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth. Warren had written:
The defendants . . . were engaged in the business of purveying
textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic
interest of their customers. They were plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect. I believe that the State and Federal Governments can constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that
these cases present to us, and that is all we need to decide.46
Brennan took this "pandering" rationale, which Warren had offered as an alternative to the Roth rationale, and incorporated it
41. 378 U.S. at 192-95; cf. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
42. Justices Black and Stewart wrote separate opinions concurring in the result.
Justice Douglas joined Black's opinion, and Justice White concurred in the result
without opinion.
43. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
44. 383 U.S. at 418. The lawyer who argued for Memoirs in the Supreme Court,
and who deserves the greatest credit for the development of "social value" as an
independent test of obscenity, has written an excellent book about his efforts, culminating in Memoirs, to establish that test. CHARLES REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY
(1968). Rembar's book docs more than describe the course of litigation ending with
Memoirs. For the layman and beginning law student it provides some exceptionally
good and understandable discussions of some difficult legal concepts; and for lawyers
it affords considerable insight into the strategy of a successful advocate.
When he concludes, however, that "In Memoirs the [social value] theory became
a rule of law," (id. at 489) Rembar exaggerates the significance of Brennan's Memoirs
opinion. Of the three Justices who endorsed that opinion, only Brennan himself now
remains on the Court; and the endorsement of his value theory that Rembar finds in
the separate opinions of Stewart, Harlan, and Douglas (see id. at 480-81) is anything
but clear.
45. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
46. 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957), quoted in 383 U.S. at 467.
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into the Roth test itself, saying that "[w]here the purveyor's sole
emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publication,
that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity." 47 He
continued:
It is important to stress that this analysis simply elaborates the test
by which the obscenity vel non of the material must be judged.
"Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation
through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene
even though in other contexts the material would escape such condemnation.48
Four Justices dissented in Ginzburg v. United States. 49 Moreover,
some of the Justices who silently concurred in Brennan's conclusion
did not agree with his reasoning in Ginzburg, as their opinions in
other cases make clear. 50 In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, six of the
Justices demurred to Brennan's reasoning, although some of them
did concur in the result. 51 Thus, Justice Brennan's formulation of
the Roth test "as elaborated in subsequent cases" was subscribed to
by only two of his colleagues: Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas. Both Warren and Fortas have left the Court, and consequently the only present Justice who has endorsed the Memoirs
formulation is Justice Brennan himself. Even more significant, only
three of the Justices who are now on the Court have genuinely endorsed even the reasoning of Roth: Justices Brennan, White, and
Stewart. Justice Stewart professes loyalty to Roth, but insists that
obscenity must be limited in meaning to "hard-core pornography." 02
His brethren seem to feel that Justice Stewart's definition of obscenity is "not dissimilar" to that propounded by Brennan in
Memoirs, 53 but Stewart himself found enough of a distinction that
he refused to join in Brennan's Memoirs opinion and instead con47. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
48. 383 U.S. at 475-76.
49. Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart.
50. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441-55 (1966) CTustice Clark,
dissenting). It is never safe to assume that silent acquiescence in a majority opinion
indicates an endorsement of anything more than the result reached. See \V. MURPHY,
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY ch. 3 (1964).
51. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined Brennan's opinion; Justices
Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred in the result in separate opinions.
52. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
53. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967).
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curred separately. 54 Justice White also professes loyalty to Roth, but
he dissented from the decision in Memoirs, and from Justice Brennan's formulation of the Roth test in that case. White insists that
"social importance" or "social value" under Roth "is not an independent test of obscenity but is relevant only to determining the
predominant prurient interest of the material . . . ." 55 Justice
Marshall, too, claims adherence to Roth, but in reality he has
vitiated the fundamental holding of that case. Thus, even among
the Justices who profess adherence to Roth, there is substantial disagreement as to the meaning and application of the Roth test. All of
the other incumbent Justices who are currently on the Court have
flatly rejected Roth's basic proposition that obscenity is without constitutional protection.56
This writer's conviction that the bell has tolled for Roth rests,
however, upon more than the simple observation that Roth's adherents do not constitute a majority of the members of the present
Court. The conviction is based primarily upon the reasoning which
received the endorsement of a majority of the Justices in nvo recent
obscenity cases: Ginsberg v. New York 51 and Stanley v. Georgia. 58

2.

Ginsberg v. New York

There are three particular elements of the Roth obscenity
doctrine which are challenged by the holding in Ginsberg v. New
York. First, although there has been some dissent, 59 the adherents of
Roth have generally agreed with Justice Brennan that the "contemporary community standards" aspect of the Roth test contemplates the national community, not state and local communities. 00 Second, at least partially because of the first proposition, ad54. 383 U.S. 413, 421 (1966).
55. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
56. No attempt has been made to determine the position of Chief Justice Burger
on obscenity questions from his opinions in lower court cases. Whatever views he
might have expressed in his former position, it is to be expected that as a Justice his
views might change. He is no longer bound as a lower court judge, but may develop
his own position on the questions as he chooses.
57. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). This case should not be confused with Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See text accompanying notes 15-16, 45, 47, 49 supra.
Ginsberg has been called "perhaps the final element in a relatively integrated con•
cept of obscenity." Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's
Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 153. This writer would rather call
it the first element of a new doctrinal approach to obscenity.
58. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
59. E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (Chief Justice Warren,
joined by Justice Clark, dissenting).
60. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964).
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herents of the Roth test seem generally agreed with Justice Brennan
that "[s]ince it is only 'obscenity' that is excluded from the constitutional protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene
necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law"; 61 thus the
question of the obscenity of materials cannot be left to the decision
of state and lower federal courts, but the Supreme Court itself must
shoulder the "difficult, recurring, and unpleasant task." 62 Third,
under Roth the possibility of harm resulting from obscenity is irrelevant. 63 In Roth, the Court explicitly rejected the harmfulness of
materials as a criterion, observing that because obscenity is not protected speech, it is unnecessary to consider its relationship to harmful
conduct. 64 Ginsberg casts doubt upon each of these propositions.
In Ginsberg v. New York, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of
the Court, Justices Stewart and Harlan submitted separate concurring opinions, and Justices Fortas, Black, and Douglas dissented.
The departures from traditional Roth doctrine in Justice Brennan's opinion are particularly interesting because Justice Brennan
himself wrote the opinion in Roth and had fully accepted the Roth
doctrine in his opinions in Jacobellis and Memoirs, and because
his opinion in Ginsberg was joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices White and Marshall, all of whom have professed loyalty to
Roth.65
Ginsberg involved a New York statute that prohibited the selling
to minors of some pictures or publications which were "harmful to
61. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964).
62. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964). Here again, there has been some
dissent. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202·03 (1964) (Chief Justice Warren,
joined by Justice Clark, dissenting). But even Justice Harlan, who rejects the Roth test,
agrees that it places the onus of decision on the Supreme Court. See his dissenting
opinions in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 459-60 (1966), Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957).
63. For a discussion of the disconnection of obscenity controls from apprehended
harm, see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L.
REv. 391 (1963).
64. 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957). It may be assumed that material which deals with
sex, but which is not obscene, could be suppressed if it were, in Douglas' phrase, "so
closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion). We may disregard the occasional
overbroad statements indicating the contrary [e.g., "Our holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene ••• ,"
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)]. Nonobscene material dealing with sex
surely has no greater protection, whether or not any less protection, than political
expression. However, there have been no cases in which nonobscene material dealing
with sex has been found so related to illegal action as to justify suppression on that
ground.
65. For a discussion of Justice Marshall's position, see text accompanying note 87
infra.
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minors." 66 The phrase "harmful to minors" was defined by the
statute in terms substantially equivalent to the criteria for obscenity
which were endorsed in Justice Brennan's opinion in Memoirs, 67
except that each element of the statutory definition specifically referred to minors. 68 The Supreme Court in affirming the conviction
66. Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, [1965] 1 Laws of N.Y. 1066, as amended, N.Y.
§§ 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1967), provides:
Exposing minors to harmful materials
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) "Minor" means any person under the age of seventeen years.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of
the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof
below the to,p of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual
intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals,
pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.
(d) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(e) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a
person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of
being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so
clothed.
·
(f) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest
of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
(g) "Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or reason to know,
or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of
both:
(i) the character and content of any material described herein which is
reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake
shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a
reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or
similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body
which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or
sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) of sub•
division two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and
which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary
consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or
pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary consideration to premises
whereon there is exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in
whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and
which is harmful to minors.
4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor.
67. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra. For a similar, but less careful, attempt
to codify the language of Supreme Court obscenity cases, see Cain v. Commonwealth,
437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky.), appeal docketed, 38 U.SL.W. 3095 (U.S. July 16, 1969) (No.
347), construing KY. REv. STAT. § 436.101 (Supp. 1968).
68. See note 66 supra.
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of the defendant for violating the statute explicitly noted that "the
'girlie' picture magazines involved in the sales here are not obscene
for adults ...." 69 The Court could have upheld this statute without
the slightest compromise of Roth. It could have reasoned that
the special interests of the state in protecting its children and in
protecting parental control over their upbringing justify the suppression, with regard to minors, of constitutionally protected expression, upon the application of a less rigorous test than the clear
and present danger test. Such_ an approach is supported by precedent,
as Justice Brennan seemed to recognize when he wrote, "[E]ven
where there is an invasion of protected freedoms . . . the power of
the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope
of its authority over adults." 70
The Court, however, did not adopt that approach. Instead,
Justice Brennan's opinion endorsed the concept of "variable obscenity," under which material that could not constitutionally be prohibited for adults may nonetheless be constitutionally suppressed as
obscene with respect to minors. 71 Such a holding was clearly not required; the statute did not use the term "obscenity," 72 and on the
face of the statute the obscenity vel non of the material was not relevant to conviction. But Justice Brennan regarded the statute as
branding the defined material obscene for minors, and he was therefore led to compromise the doctrine of Roth. As he stated the issue:
"Appellant's primary attack ... is leveled at the power of the State
... to define the material's obscenity on the basis of its appeal to
minors, and thus exclude material so defined from the area of protected expression. " 73
Under Roth, the ultimate determination of the obscenity vel non
of any particular material was to be made by the Supreme Court; but
in Ginsberg the Court held that the determination is to be made by
the state legislature-at least when obscenity with respect to minors
is at issue-subject only to the requirement that the Court must find
the legislature's judgment rational. 74 Moreover, according to Roth,
obscenity was to be determined by reference to a national standard;
but under Ginsberg, which permitted the definition of obscenity
for minors to be made by the several state legislatures, variations
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

390
390
See
See
390
390

U.S. 629, 634 (1968).
U.S. at 638, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
390 U.S. at 634-43.
note 66 supra.
U.S. at 635.
U.S. at 641-43.
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from state to state in the definition of obscenity for minors are
encouraged. Finally, while under Roth the harmfulness of the obscene material was irrelevant, the Ginsberg Court approved the
definition of obscenity for minors in terms of harm. The New York
statute contained a legislative finding that the kind of material
prohibited as to minors was "a basic factor in impairing the
ethical and moral development of our youth." 75 In that regard the
Court stated: "To sustain state power to exclude materials defined
as obscenity by § 484-h requires only that we be able to say that it was
not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors." 76 The point to be
emphasized is not that the rational-basis test thus applied in the case
of minors is less rigorous than a clear and present danger test, but
rather that the Court regarded harm to minors as justifying classification of material as obscene for them. Under Roth, the presence or
absence of any prospective harm was irrelevant to obscenity; in
Ginsberg, the possible harm to minors is the touchstone of obscenity
for them.
It is possible to regard Ginsberg v. New York as not affecting the
fundamental premises of Roth obscenity doctrine, and as merely
taking account of the special problems associated with minors.
Certainly, Roth and the other earlier cases did not involve statutes
specifically aimed at the protection of minors, so that Ginsberg can
be technically distinguished from those holdings. However, the reasoning of Justice Brennan's opinion in Ginsberg deviates sharply
from the propositions even he had announced in earlier cases, and,
while those propositions were not addressed to the problem of protecting minors, they were on their face categorical.
At the very least, Brennan's opinion in Ginsberg v. New York
raises some embarrassing questions for proponents of Roth. I£ the
power of the state to classify materials as obscene for minors depends
upon the reasonableness of its finding that the materials in question
are harmful to minors, the classification of the materials as obscene
does not seem to give the state any greater power to suppress them
than it would have if the concept of obscenity were discarded. Even
75. Law of April 29, 1955, ch. 548, § 2, [1955] 2 Laws of N.Y. 1988 [formerly codified in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (McKinney App. 1967)]. The legislature had also
declared that such material is "a clear and present danger to the people of the state."
But the Court held that, since obscenity is not protected expression, it could be
"suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase
'clear and present danger' in its application to protected speech." 390 U.S. at 641,
citing Roth.
76. 390 U.S. at 641.
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in the case of protected freedoms, as the Court itself noted in Ginsberg, the state may interfere more readily when minors are concerned
than it may in the case of adults.77 On its face, the New York statute
at stake in Ginsberg seems to have been premised on that view, since
it did not label the materials as "obscene," but rather suppressed
them because they were found to be "harmful to minors." Furthermore, insofar as the case recognizes harm to minors as a touchstone
of obscenity for minors, it adds a new dimension to obscenity doctrine. However different the standard of proof of harm might beclear and present danger or whatever-if it could be proved that
some material not meeting the constitutional standards for obscenity
set out in Roth and its progeny is nevertheless harmful to adults,
might it be held to be "obscene"? And if some material may be suppressed as obscene upon a sufficient showing of harm to adults, what
is accomplished by classifying that material as obscene? Such material
could be suppressed even though not obscene, under the clear and
present danger test or whatever variation of that test is to be applied
in the case of nonobscene speech.78 Conversely, if harm is the touchstone of obscenity, what justification is there for the suppression ot
materials whicli do satisfy the constitutional tests of Roth and its
progeny, but cannot be shown to be harmful? Finally, insofar as
Ginsberg v. New York holds that a legislature may adjust the definition of obscenity when children are concerned, the Court has compromised traditional obscenity doctrine by recognizing the need to
weigh the interest in free speech against the legitimate interest of
the state in safeguarding its youth; and if protection of youth
is a substantial interest that may outweigh the interest in protection
of speech, there may well be other interests which could have a
similar effect. In Roth, the Court had treated obscenity as a distinct
class of expression, excluded from constitutional protection, and not
to be judged as to its suppressibility by the same standards which are
applied to other classes of expression. In Ginsberg there was a
radical change; while the case dealt with the special situation of
minors, the Court in effect applied the same sort of standards that it
might apply to determine the suppressibility of any other class of
speech.
3. Stanley v. Georgia
The requiem which began with Ginsberg continued with
Stanley v. Georgia. In Stanley, the Court's opinion rested upon
77. See note 70 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 127-48 infra.

December 1969]

Requiem for Roth

199

the assumed premise that the films in question were obscene.79 However, notwithstanding the unqualified proposition of Roth that
obscenity is not protected expression,80 the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for knowing possession of obscene matter. Roth
was distinguished from Stanley on its facts, and the Court insisted
that "Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by
today's holding." 81 The Court noted that Roth and the other cases
dealt with materials which were being disseminated or distributed;
Stanley, on the other hand, involved "mere private possession of
obscene matter."82 The Court acknowledged that the Roth declaration that obscenity is not protected was on its face unqualified, but
held that it must nevertheless be read in the context of the facts in
that case, and could not operate mechanically to decide a case of
mere private possession. The Court stated: "Roth and its progeny
certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem
of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections."83 According
to the Court, Roth and the cases following it discerned an important state interest in regulating the commercial distribution of
obscene material; but the facts in Stanley, the Court held, disclosed
even more important, private interests which must be protected.
Stanley, the Court noted,
is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his
own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into
the contents of his library.... If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
79. In this case, the authorities secured a warrant to search Stanley's home for
evidence of alleged bookmaking activities. In the course of their search, they came
upon three rolls of movie film in a desk drawer. Using a projector and screen also
found in the home, they viewed the films, and, concluding that they were obscene,
seized them and commenced a prosecution for knowing possession of obscene matter
in violation of Georgia law. 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969). Although the Court might have
reversed Stanley's conviction on the ground that the films had been illegally seized
and should not have been admitted into evidence [see 394 U.S. at 569-72 Oustice
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and White, concurring in the result)], the ma•
jority chose to rest its decision on the obscenity question (394 U.S. at 559). Since the
defendant did not argue on appeal that the films were not in fact obscene, the Court
assumed for purposes of its decision that they were. 394 U.S. at 559 n.2.
BO. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
81. 394 U.S. at 568.
82. 394 U.S. at 561.
83. 394 U.S. at 563.
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may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought
of giving government the power to control men's minds.8 4
The opinion of the Court in the Stanley case was written by
Justice Marshall. It was joined, however, by Justices Douglas and
Harlan, each of whom has consistently and persistently rejected the
Roth test; and it was not joined by Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
White, all of whom have been consistent adherents of Roth. 85 In this
circumstance, the pallid claim that "Roth and the cases following
that decision are not impaired by today's holding" cannot be given
much weight. 86 The fact is that the reasoning in Stanley is quite
inconsistent with what Roth had been thought to have held. On its
face, Roth made no allowance for interests which might be adverse
to the interest in controlling obscenity; it held flatly that obscenity
was not protected. But in Stanley the Court reinterpreted Roth
merely to recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with obscenity. While on the facts of the previous cases this interest was
not outweighed by any competing interest, in Stanley it was outweighed by the interest in an individual's privacy and freedom to
view what he pleases, even the admittedly obscene, in his mm home.
This balancing of competing interests is reminiscent of the approach
which has typically been taken by the Court in cases involving the
suppression of nonobscene publications.87
The state argued in Stanley that the prohibition of private possession of obscene materials was justified because "exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of
sexual violence." 88 The Court did not say that a sufficient showing of
a cause and effect relationship between obscenity and deviant behavior could not justify such a statute; it held merely that "[g]iven
the present state of knowledge" the evidence of cause and effect was
not sufficient. 89 In other words, the circumstances that would make
the clear and present danger test applicable were not present. In
Roth, the clear and present danger test had been dismissed as
84. 394 U.S. at 565.
85. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White joined in a concurring opinion which
declined to reach the obscenity question and argued for reversal of the conviction
on search and seizure grounds. 394 U.S. at 569-72.
86. The considerations of strategy that might explain the willingness of a Justice
to concur in an opinion that contains language to which he might not fully subscribe are explored, with valuable insight, in w. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY ch. 3 (1964).
87. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For more recent cases adopting this approach, see notes 159-63 infra.
88. 394 U.S. at 566.
89. 394 U.S. at 567.
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irrelevant to obscenity on the ground that obscenity was outside
constitutional protection.90 Again the Court distinguished Roth as
not involving the competing interest present in Stanley.91 But
Stanley left open the possibility that a showing of clear and present
danger might justify suppression even of mere private possession of
obscene matter. If, as Stanley suggested, Roth merely recognized a
state interest in the control of obscenity, which must be balanced
against other interests, perhaps we cannot say that the clear and
present danger test does not apply to obscenity because obscenity is
unprotected. Perhaps instead we must say that in view of the state
interest in controlling obscenity, and absent any greater countervailing interest, meeting a lesser standard than clear and present
danger would be sufficient to justify suppression; but if a sufficient
countervailing interest is present, suppression of even the admittedly
"obscene" would be unconstitutional without proof of clear and
present danger. That, of course, is not at all what Roth said; but it
is, in effect, what the Court now has said in Stanley.
The recognition that other interests may, under any circumstances, compete against the suppression of obscenity cuts at the very
foundation of the Roth rule. To say that obscenity is without constitutional protection is very different from saying that the government has an interest in controlling obscenity-an interest which,
however, must be balanced against other interests. To accept the latter formulation is to treat obscenity as subject to the same considerations that the Court has employed with respect to other classes of
speech.92

II.

COMPLETING THE UNFINISHED SYMPHONY

A. Incorporation of the First Amendment by the Fourteenth
The general conclusion which this writer has drawn, from the
attrition in the ranks of Roth's adherents on the Court and even
more from the recent Ginsberg v. New York and Stanley v. Georgia
opinions, is that the fundamental holding of the Roth case-that
obscenity is a discrete class of expression, excluded from the constitutional protection guaranteed to other kinds of expression and
therefore to be treated differently from other kinds of expressionhas already met its demise. It remains to consider what better avenue
90. 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957).
91. 394 U.S. at 567.
92. See text accompanying notes 127-58 infra.
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of constitutional approach to the obscenity problem might be open
to the Court.
It is the first amendment which inhibits national interference
with the freedom of expression, but it is the fourteenth amendment
which inhibits interference with that freedom by the states; and
there are good grounds for arguing that the degree of inhibition is
not the same.93
The proposition that the Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and thus applied against
the states has muddied the waters of constitutional jurisprudence for
three decades-ever since Justices Black and Douglas joined the
Court. Each of these Justices brought with him to the Court a
strong distaste for the kind of judicial obstructionism which had
resulted from the Court's assumption of legislative policy functions
under the undefined "due process" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and each was convinced that to avoid obstructionism the scope of "due process" must somehow be confined. Consequently, each endorsed the proposition that the phrase "due
process of law" in the fourteenth amendment was intended as
a shorthand reference to the guarantees of the Bill of Rights--neither
more nor less.94
There is considerable irony in the history of the Black-Douglas
"incorporation" doctrine. The doctrine originated in reaction
against the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process concepts,
under both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, to invalidate
economic and social legislation of both the states and Congress.95
However, unless the adherents of the doctrine contend that fifth as
well as fourteenth amendment "due process" is exhausted by the list
of specifics in the Bill of Rights-a contention which would make
the fifth amendment due process clause meaninglessly redundantthe doctrine does nothing to prevent continued abuse in the Court's
treatment of federal legislation. Moreover, since the fifth as well as
the other amendments constituting the Bill of Rights is incorporated
into the fourteenth, the undefined due process clause of the fifth
amendment, with its potential for judicial abuse, remains applicable
to the states precisely because of incorporation. But the doctrine's
93. See text accompanying notes 127-67 infra.
94. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-72 (1947) (Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas, dissenting).
95. For examples of this use of due process, see Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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inability to provide the desired protection against obstructionist
application of the undefined due process clause96 is not the only irony.
The doctrine arose as a result of concern over substantive due
process; but its significance has been greatest in the field of procedural due process. During the last thirty years, one after another
of the procedural guarantees contained in the second through eighth
amendments has been held to be an element of fourteenth amendment due process; and the opinions in some of the cases have spoken
in the language of incorporation.97 But the substantive rights protected by the first amendment against congressional abridgment had
been held protected by the fourteenth amendment against state
infringement long before Black and Douglas came to the bench
with their incorporation doctrine.98 Moreover, the doctrine which
has effectively ended the abuse of substantive due process-an abuse
that incorporation was intended to end-has developed under both
the fifth and fourteenth amendments independent of the incorporation doctrine.99
Despite the use in some majority opinions of the language of incorporation, no majority of the Court has ever genuinely endorsed
the incorporation doctrine of Justices Douglas and Black.100 The
most accurate characterization of the Court's actual approach is
perhaps that recently tendered by the Court through Justice White
-that in developing the procedural due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment, "the Court has looked increasingly to the
Bill of Rights for guidance." 101 The literal incorporation doctrine,
which would apply the Bill of Rights guarantees as such to the states,
96. The incorporation of the fifth amendment's due process clause is not the only
reason that the incorporation theory of the fourteenth amendment fails to insure
restraint. See, e.g., Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
98. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Later cases explicitly included the freedom of religion
[Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)] and reaffirmed the inclusion of freedom
of assembly [De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)].
99. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See
also Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951).
100. "A few members of the Court have taken the position that the intention of
those who drafted the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was simply, and
exclusively, to make the provisions of the first eight Amendments applicable to state
action. [Citations to Justice Black.] This view has never been accepted by this Court."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) Oustice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, dissenting).
101. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
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seems ultimately destined to fade from the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court with the passing in due time of its principal advocates, Justices Black and Douglas, a casualty of the free competition
in ideas which Justices Black and Douglas themselves, to their
eternal credit, have so stoutly defended. 102
But even if it were conceded that the phrase "due process of
102. The distinction between the Black-Douglas literal incorporation doctrine
and the different doctrine which emerges from the Court's state criminal procedure
decisions since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is very important. The literal incorporation doctrine holds that fourteenth amendment due process means the Bill of
Rights, as such. By contrast, the doctrine articulated with increasing clarity in the
recent opinions holds that fourteenth amendment due process means procedures that
are "fundamental ••. that is ... necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered
liberty," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968), and that courts, in defining these fundamental procedures, should "look ..• to the Bill of Rights for guidance." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148, 149 n.14 (1968). That doctrine may appropriately be called the "guidance" doctrine. Considering a uniform conception of
American justice more important than federal diversity, it imposes those fundamental
procedures which happen to be enumerated in the Bill of Rights equally upon federal
and state governments: "Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' .•• the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal Governments." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 795 (1969). Unlike the literal incorporation doctrine, however, the "guidance"
doctrine leaves open the dual possibilities that some provisions of the Bill of Rights
might not be fundamental, and thus not inhere in fourteenth amendment due process,
and that some procedures not enumerated in the Bill of Rights might nevertheless
be fundamental and thus required by due process. Illustrative of the latter possibility
is North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), in which a majority of the Court,
over Justice Black's predictable dissent, held that while the double jeopardy provision
of the Bill of Rights, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause, did not preclude a heavier penalty upon conviction at a second
trial, nevertheless the concept of due process itself-without reference to the Bill of
Rights-could and in Pearce's case did. Both the Black-Douglas literal incorporation
doctrine and the different doctrine emerging from the recent cases are at odds with
the due process methodology represented by Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), and still endorsed by Justice Harlan [see, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 807-13 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 342-44 (1969) (concurring opinion)].
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), Justice Douglas wrote
the opinion for the Court holding unconstitutional a Wisconsin garnishment statute
which permitted the taking of an employee's wages without notice and a prior hearing. No specific provision of the Bill of Rights was held violated; rather, Douglas
and the Court merely stated that "this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates
the fundamental principles of due process." 395 U.S. at 342. Justice Black dissented
precisely because the statute offended no specific provision of the Bill of Rights.
Douglas and the majority found that the case involved a fundamental requirement of
fourteenth amendment due process which was not among the specifics of the Bill of
Rights. Again in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, while Douglas did find the double
jeopardy clause sufficient in itself to decide the case, he added specifically, "I agree
with the Court as to the reach of due process." 395 U.S. at 726. His opinion for the
Court in Sniadach and his concurrence in Pearce raise the question whether Douglas
himself is going "soft" on the Black-Douglas literal incorporation doctrine. Douglas,
of course, could answer that he still holds to literal incorporation, but that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth and that
the fifth amendment clause guarantees, inter alia, the rights protected in Sniadach and
Pearce. This reply would illustrate the irony of the literal incorporation doctrine
already pointed out in the text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
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law" in the fourteenth amendment incorporates the procedural
guarantees of the Bill of Rights and applies them against the states, it
is still possible that there would be different standards for state and
federal suppression of speech. Well before either Justice Black or
Justice Douglas had risen to the bench, the Supreme Court had
already established that the "first amendment freedoms" were
secured against the states by the fourteenth amendment.103 Those
freedoms were held included, however, not as elements of the "due
process" without which life, liberty, and property could not be
abridged, but rather as elements of the "liberty" which the fourteenth amendment said could not be abridged except by due
process. 104 Controversy over the Black-Douglas incorporation doctrine has obscured this essential distinction. Black and Douglas
might say that a state infringement of rights of expression admittedly
protected by the first amendment is a denial of "due process"; but
the cases which held the first amendment freedoms protected by
the fourteenth regarded such infringements as admitted violations
of protected "liberty" and went on to inquire whether the admitted
violations were justified because they were consistent with due
process. A close look at those cases will bear this analysis ·out.
The first case to hold that freedom of speech is among the
liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment was Gitlow v. New
York, 105 in which the Supreme Court sustained a New York statute
prohibiting the advocacy of criminal anarchy. The Court did not
resort to the expedient of excluding this class of expression from
constitutional protection-an expedient that later would be used in
cases involving libel1° 6 and obscenity.107 There was no denial that
the statute deprived defendants of protected rights of expression;
rather, the Court, giving considerable weight to the judgment of the
state legislature, held that the statute was not "an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably
infringing the freedom of speech or press." 108 The Court's statement
uses the familiar language of due process, which the Court was consistently using in that era, as it had in the past, in cases under the
fourteenth amendment which involved admitted infringements of
103. Sec note 98 supra.
104. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
105. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
106. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
107. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
108. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (emphasis added).
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other liberties than the freedom of speech.109 What the majority did
in Gitlow was not to endorse a so-called "bad tendency" test for interpretation of the first amendment, 110 but rather to apply in the case
of state regulation the traditional fourteenth amendment due
process test.
Similarly, in Whitney v. California111 and Fiske v. Kansas, 112 the
Court referred to the standards of due process in order to determine
the constitutionality of admitted state infringements of protected
speech. In both cases protected rights were infringed, but there were
factual differences between them bearing on the arbitrariness or
reasonableness of the infringements. In Whitney the infringement
was held to be consistent with due process,113 while in Fiske· the infringement was held to violate due process.114 The next year, in New
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 115 the Court confronted the
claim that New York had unconstitutionally deprived a person of
liberty to belong to an unincorporated association. That this liberty
was protected by the fourteenth amendment and that New York had
taken it away was admitted; but since the Court found the deprivation of liberty to be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective, it sustained the deprivation as consistent with due process. 116
109. See, e.g., cases cited note 95 supra. See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 66163 (1887). In cases involving economic regulations, the Court from 1890 (Minnesota
Rate Case, 134 U.S. 418) until 1934 (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502) stood ready to
overrule legislative judgments on the question of reasonableness versus arbitrariness; but
whatever the degree of deference to legislative judgment, the requirement of reasonableness is a due process concept. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(holding Congress to a reasonableness standard under the fifth amendment's due
process clause).
110. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 909-10 (1963).
lll. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
112. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
113. "We cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right
of free speech, assembly or association ••••" 274 U.S. at 372.
114. The Court held that the statute, as applied, was "an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty
of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 274 U.S. at 387.
115. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
116. 278 U.S. at 72-73:
The relator's contention under the due process clause is that the statute deprives
him of liberty in that it prevents him from exercising his right of membership
in the association. But his liberty in this regard, like most other personal rights,
must yield to the rightful exertion of the police power. There can be no doubt
that under that power the State may prescribe and apply to associations having
an oath-bound membership any reasonable regulation calculated to confine their
purposes and activities within limits which are consistent with the rights of
others and the public welfare. The requirement in § 53 that each association
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Taken together, Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, and Zimmerman stand for
the proposition that a state may infringe protected liberties, but may
not infringe them "unreasonably" or "unwarrantably."
The approach of these early cases, protecting so-called "first
amendment freedoms" from state infringement, should not be carelessly dismissed as archaic. Admittedly, it is not the approach which
prevails on the face of more recent opinions. It is an approach,
however, which has been obscured and then forgotten, rather than
deliberately rejected. Near the close of the 1968 term, on June 9,
1969, the Supreme Court observed that Whitney v. California "has
been thoroughly discredited by later decisions," and held per curiam
without dissent that Whitney is overruled.117 What was deliberately
rejected, however, was not the due process methodology of Whitney
and the other early cases discussed above; that aspect of Whitney
received no mention in the 1969 case. What was rejected was Whitney's conclusion that a criminal syndicalism statute was constitutionally valid despite its failure to distinguish between advocacy and
incitement-a distinction which decisions subsequent to Whitney
had determined must be made. Thus it remains true that the traditional due process approach of the early cases to problems of state infringement of first amendment freedoms has never been deliberately
rejected. Nonetheless, that older approach has not been openly
followed in more recent cases; and if it is to be argued that such an
approach has-or should have-continued vitality, then the factors
accounting for its obscuration must be explored.
The doctrine of Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, and Zimmerman was
reaffirmed in 1931 in Near v. Minnesota. 118 Speaking again in traditional due process terms, the Court in Near explicitly stated that the
fourteenth amendment restraint on state interference with protected
expression is not absolute.m One theme of due process doctrine prior
to Near had been that, while a large degree of regulation infringing
protected liberties to accomplish police power ends was permitted,
the due process clause precluded any regulation which destroyed the
shall file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, oath of
membership, etc., with a list of members and officers • • • is not arbitrary or
oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be of real effect. Of course, power to
require the disclosure includes authority to prevent individual members of an
association which has failed to comply from attending meetings or retaining
membership with knowledge of its default. We conclude that the due process
clause is not violated.
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
118. 283 U.S. 697, 707.
119. 283 U.S. at 707-08.
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"essence" of a protected liberty. 120 After alluding to that principle,
the Court in Near continued: "Liberty, in each of its phases, has its
history and connotation and, in the present instance, the inquiry is
as to the historic conception of the liberty of the press and whether
the statute under review violates the essential attributes of that
liberty." 121 Thus, when Near was decided, there was a clearly recognized difference between the question whether a given liberty was
protected, and the due process question whether an infringement of
the protected liberty violated "the essential attributes of that liberty."
That period in the Court's history was the heyday of substantive due
process, and it was often by answer to the latter question that
the Court struck down legislation which was found to eviscerate
liberties that it admitted were subject to less destructive restraints.122
Within a few years after Near, however, due process adjudication
changed; even the cases cited by the Near Court in framing the due
process issue were explicitly overruled. 123 Near, like Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, and Zimmerman, had applied to state infringements of
protected freedoms of speech, press, and association the same due
process standard that the Court had been applying to state infringements of business and economic liberties. But now it was held that
when infringements upon the latter sort of liberties are in issue,
due process required not reasonableness as assessed by the Court's
own judgment, nor the integrity of judicially defined "essentials"
of those liberties, but merely a rational basis for the legislative finding that the infringement was reasonably related to the accomplishment of some legitimate objective.124
No person who values the fundamental freedoms of expression
120. The examples given in Near, 283 U.S. at 707-08, were that an owner could
not be deprived of the right to a fair return, since that right is of the essence of
ownership [Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 596 (1915); Railroad
Commn. Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886)], and that while legislation may regulate contractual activity [Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 161, 165 (1895)], it may not inter•
£ere with the indispensable essentials of liberty of contract [Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927): Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923)]. See also Hurtado v. California, IIO U.S. 516,
532 (1884), in which the Court stated that the fourteenth amendment "must be held
to guarantee ..• the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property."
121. 283 U.S. at 708.
122. See, e.g., cases cited note 120 supra.
123. The Court in Near cited Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), and the
precedents which that case had followed, Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927), and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 283 U.S. at 708.
Adkins was explicitly overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
400 (1937). Tyson and Ribnik were severely curtailed in Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 537 (1934), and Ribnik was later explicitly overruled, necessarily carry•
ing T)•son with it in its demise, in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
124. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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secured by the first and fourteenth amendments could countenance
applying such a "minimum rationality" test to determine the legitimacy of state infringements upon those paramount liberties. Yet to
continue disposing of state speech and press cases in a manner consistent with the cases from Gitlow to Near would be to raise again
the specter of judicial obstructionism through the concept of substantive due process. The dilemma could have been resolved by
carefully distinguishing between the appropriate use of traditional
substantive due process doctrine and the obstructionist use to which
that doctrine had been put in the cases of economic and social legislation.125 But in the years after the bitter constitutional struggles of
the New Deal era, there was little tolerance for any approach which
even faintly resembled the repudiated obstructionist economic due
process doctrine. Therefore, a different escape from the apparent
dilemma had to be found. If the approach taken by the Court in
Near could not be followed, and yet could not be flatly rejected, it
had to be reinterpreted; and so it was. Near had inquired whether
the state action which had infringed the protected liberty violated "the
essential attributes of that liberty." 126 With the demise of obstructionist substantive due process, the distinction between that question
and the question whether a particular liberty was protected was
easily overlooked. Attention was diverted from the due process issue,
as it had been framed in the earlier cases, to the question whether a
given example or class of expression was protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression.

B.

Protected Liberty and Due Process

If the content of fourteenth amendment "liberty," as it regards
speech, is defined by reference to the first amendment, then whatever
is excluded from the protection of the latter must also be excluded
from the former. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."
On its face, this prohibition is absolute; but it has never been authoritatively construed to prohibit all congressional interference
with all expression under all circumstances and at all times. Certain
classes of expression have been held to be excluded from the first
amendment concept of protected expression; this was true for a time
of libel, 127 and it was true of obscenity under Roth. As to other kinds
125. Such a distinction is articulated in the text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
126. 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
127. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see Kalven, The New York Times
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of expression, the classic formulation of the protection afforded by
the first amendment is based upon Justice Holmes' statement in
Schenck v. United States: 128 "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." 129 In subsequent opinions, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis argued that the proximity must be great and
that the substantive evils feared must be substantial.130 Later opinions have suggested that the constitutional protection varies with
the substantiality of the substantive evils feared, with the proximity
of their relationship to the expression, or with both. 131
Justice Holmes' statement in Schenck is typical of the eloquent
imprecision characteristic of his opinions. He does not make clear
whether the clear and present danger doctrine is an exception to
the provision that there shall be "no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech," or whether it is a limitation upon the concept of "freedom of speech." He does not indicate whether, when Congress outlaws sufficiently dangerous speech, it is abridging-but constitutionally-the "freedom of speech," or whether, instead, there is no
abridgement because such dangerous speech is outside the constitutional concept of "speech."132 The distinction is highly significant
for first amendment doctrine respecting congressional power. As if
this imprecision were not enough, Holmes and Brandeis confounded
things further in s~bsequent cases. Schenck involved only the first
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP, CT. R.Ev.
191, 217-18. But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
129. 249 U.S. at 52. Justices Douglas and Black would eliminate even the clear
and present danger exception to the first amendment. Brandenburg v.. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 449-57 (1969) (concurring opinions).
130. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
131. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
132. Under either of these views, the clear and present danger test or its variations
would arguably apply as fully to the fourteenth amendment as to the first. If "speech"
in the first amendment is defined to exclude speech which presents a clear and
present danger, it is that restricted concept of speech which is contained in the
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, if "speech"
is a broad term, including dangerous speech, but legislation abridging it is permissible as an exception to the "no law" prohibition of the first amendment, it is
arguable that what is included in fourteenth amendment "liberty" is not "freedom
of speech" but rather the first amendment right to have "no law" passed "abridging
the freedom of speech." Under the latter view, the exceptions to the "no law" prohibition of the first amendment would be integral to fourteenth amendment liberty
regarding speech.
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amendment, but Gitlow was decided on fourteenth amendment due
process grounds. 133 Yet in Gitlow, Holmes dissented, joined by Brandeis, urging application of the clear and present danger test.134
The inference arises that this test, initially fashioned under the first
amendment-which contains no due process clause- was now being
urged as the applicable criterion of due process of law. The validity
of that inference is confirmed by Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney, in which Justice Holmes joined. The majority in
Whitney deferred to the legislature on the due process question of
the reasonableness of the infringement of speech there involved.
Brandeis construed that deferral as an abrogation to the state legislature of the decision whether a clear and present danger was presented,185 and he contended that this decision should be reserved to
the Supreme Court. To support his contention, Brandeis was obliged
to make an analogy to the aberrational line of obstructionist cases136
in which the Court had departed from older due process doctrine137
and had decided the due process question on its own assessment of
the reasonableness of economic legislation, in derogation of the legislators' judgment.1as
Even before last term, when Whitney was expressly overruled,139
there was, as the Court stated in 1951, "little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale."140 Regrettably, however, the subsequent opinions have
done no better than Justices Holmes and Brandeis themselves in
clarifying the significance of the clear and present danger test. If
l!l!l. See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
1!14. 268 U.S. 652, 672-7!1 (1925).
1!15. 274 U.S. !157, !174 (concurring opinion):
It is said to be the function of the legislature to determine whether at a particular time and under the particular circumstances the formation of, or assembly
with, a society organized to advocate criminal syndicalism constitutes a clear and
present danger of substantive evil; and that by enacting the law here in question
the legislature of California determined that question in the affirmative.
1!16. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Minnesota Rate Case, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); cases cited by
Brandeis, 274 U.S. at 374 n.l.
137. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877); text accompanying notes 202-05 infra.
1!18. 274 U.S. 357, 374 {1927) (concurring opinion):
Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly been held invalid, because unnecessary,
where the denial of liberty involved was that of engaging in a particular business. The power of the courts to strike down an offending law is no less when
the interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal
rights of free speech and assembly.
139. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); text accompanying note 117
supra.
140. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951).
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that test is offered, as in Gitlow and Whitney, as the standard of
fourteenth amendment due process, how does it apply to the
first amendment, which permits no due process infringement but
flatly provides that no law may abridge the freedom of speech?
If the test provides an exception to the "no law" prohibition, it may
exclude certain utterances from protection under either the first or
the fourteenth amendment; 141 but then it contains grave implications for our security from federal suppression, 142 and leaves undefined the factors which might justify, as consistent with due process,
state infringements of protected freedoms. If it defines a boundary
between protected and unprotected expression, it clearly applies to
both amendments; 143 but again, it leaves undefined the circumstances
under which states may infringe the protected freedoms in accordance with due process.
Because the clear and present danger test originated under the
first amendment, and because it, or variations of it, have been regularly applied to federal as well as to state legislation, 144 the test
cannot be regarded as a test of due process. The first amendment on
its face imposes a higher standard of protection than does the due
process clause, and it is to that higher standard that the clear and
present danger test provides an exception. Thus, while we may agree
with Holmes and Brandeis that infringements of liberty should be
restrained, and, while we may agree as well that the majorities in
Gitlow and Whitney provided too little restraint, 145 the contention
that clear and present danger is a due process test cannot be accepted.
Clear and present danger excludes some speech and writing from
constitutional protection, but state infringements consistent with
due process are contemplated by the fourteenth amendment even as
to protected expression.
The question remains, however, whether the clear and present
danger test is an exception to the first amendment's "no law" prohibition or an exclusion of certain types of expression from the definition of freedom of speech and press. If it is viewed as an exception
to the "no law" prohibition, it invites a proliferation of exceptions,
and ultimately leads to what Justice Frankfurter hailed as the "weighing of competing interests."146 There is considerable force in Justice
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
196-219
146.

See note 132 supra.
See text accompanying notes 146-47 infra.
See note 132 supra.
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
For a discussion of the due process standard, see text accompanying notes
infra.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519, 525 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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Black's protest that such an approach "waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to
Congress." 147 Moreover, it is a naked amendment of the constitutional language, which on its face is unequivocal and without exception: "no law."
On the other hand, "the freedom of speech ... [and] the press" is
language on its face imprecise the meaning of which must be defined
by history and judicial construction. If the clear and present danger
doctrine is viewed as a partial definition of those freedoms, judges
are not left wholly at large to balance competing interests. According to that view,
The command of the first amendment is "absolute" in the sense
that "no law" which "abridges" "the freedom of speech" is constitutionally valid.... [I]t insists on focusing the inquiry upon the definition of "abridge," "the freedom of speech," and if necessary "law,"
rather than on a general de novo balancing of interests in each case.
And the text [sic] gives weight to the constitutional decision made in
adopting the first amendment by emphasizing that the entire question
of reconciling social values and objectives is not reopened. This approach of "defining" rather than "balancing" narrows and structures
the issue for the courts, bringing it more readily within the bounds
of judicial procedures. It is true that the process of "defining" requires a weighing of various considerations, but this is not the same as
open-ended "balancing."
... [A]s already noted, the process does not result in every communication being given unqualified immunity from restriction or
regulation under the first amendment. The characterization as "absolute" does serve the purpose, however, of emphasizing the positive
features of the constitutional guarantee and limiting the area of
restraint. 148

Viewing the clear and present danger test, therefore, as defining the
freedoms of speech and the press not only is more consistent with
the language of the first amendment, but also provides greater assurance of protection from governmental suppression than does the
balancing approach of Justice Frankfurter.
If the clear and present danger test defines the freedom of expression protected by the first amendment, and the same freedom is
protected by the fourteenth, then speech sufficiently dangerous to be
excluded from the first amendment protection is excluded from
the protection of the fourteenth amendment as well. This is true
of any definition of the first amendment freedoms and explains
why, when the Court in Roth defined those freedoms to exclude
147. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
148. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 914-15 (1963).
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obscenity, it could dispose of Alberts v. California149 in the same
opinion and on the same grounds. However, the process of "defining" the terms of the first amendment does not exhaust the issues
under the fourteenth. This definitional process determines the
boundaries of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment,
but that amendment still contemplates state infringements of the
protected liberty so long as they are consistent with due process.
Careful attention to the language of the Constitution may try
the patience of some who prefer recourse to dogmatic generalities;
but if a written constitution is to have genuine meaning, the language of the document must be relevant in constitutional adjudication. We are not bound to the unascertainable "intent of the
framers" ;150 moreover, "it is a constitution we are expounding," 151
that is, it is "a constituent act [which has] called into life a being
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely
by the most gifted of its begetters."152 But whatever construction we
might put upon it, we are not free to disregard the language of the
document. 153 Faithfulness to the language dictates neither "conservative" nor "liberal" interpretation,154 but it does provide the only
basis to legitimate whatever ultimate decision is made.
Life, property, and corporal liberty are protected by the fourteenth amendment. That protection does not mean, however, that
states are precluded from executing felons, fining or imprisoning
criminals, or appropriating private property for public use; it means
only that the states cannot take such actions "without due process of
law." The protected liberty to engage in a lawful business may also
be regulated or taken away, so long as the requirement of due process
is satisfied.155 By force of the same constitutional language, the liberty of expression which is protected by the fourteenth amendment
may also be infringed, so long as the standard of due process is met.
149. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
150. See Engdahl, Book Review, 21 J. LEGAL ED. ll9 (1968).
151. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
152. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
153. Neither in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), nor
in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), was the language of the Constitution
subverted. On the contrary, the Court resorted to the explicit language of the docu•
ment-regardless of the original intention of the framers-to legitimate its holdings.
154. For instance, the celebrated recent decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), which applied the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1964), to bar all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property, is faithful
to the language of the thirteenth amendment.
155. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Several of the free speech cases decided since Near v. M innesota166
have been disposed of on what are essentially procedural due process
grounds. 157 But a number of others have been determined by essentially the same method that the Court employed freely until the New
Deal era under the aegis of substantive due process. The process of
weighing competing interests against the constitutional interest in
safeguarding protected rights, so as to accommodate the necessities
of security, peace, and order and preservation of other rights without
defeating the essential purposes of any constitutionally protected
right, is of the essence of historic substantive due process.168 This is
the process which has been used by the Court, or several of its members, to deal with numerous cases: those concerning the conflict
between demands for impartial justice and the freedoms of speech
and press,169 those concerning the effect upon rights of expression of
laws ensuring public order,160 those concerning the effect of laws
suppressing suppressible expression as inhibitions upon unsuppressible expression, 161 and those concerning laws so broadly written or
left so much to discretion in their enforcement that they threaten
greater infringement of protected rights than is necessary to secure
the competing interest.162 Nevertheless, since the revolt against the
obstructionist use of substantive due process in the social and economic spheres, the Court has invariably failed to recognize that the
balancing method which it has used in these cases is the method of
substantive due process. 163 Instead, it has treated its inquiry as
156. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See notes 118-24 supra and accompanying text.
157. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948).
158. See notes 211-12 infra and accompanying text.
159. E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter); Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
160. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941); cf. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See also, e.g., Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (concerning the inhibitive effect of laws regulating the use
of amplification devices).
161. E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959).
162. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
163. Occasionally, however, the opinions contain an exceptionally candid indication that the method used today for first and fourteenth amendment cases
is essentially the method of substantive due process. Justice Fortas, for example,
recently stated: "The test that is applicable in every case where conduct is restricted
or prohibited is whether the regulation is reasonable, due account being taken of
the paramountcy of First Amendment values." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
616 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Occasionally, also, the Court frankly applies simi-
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unrelated to the due process clause, and therefore just as appropriate
to the first amendment as to the fourteenth. Recognition that these
grounds for decision are in the tradition of substantive due process
will put an end to the "balancing away" of first amendment
rights. 164 It will ensure that the first amendment will serve its purpose as a guarantee that no federal law will abridge the freedoms of
speech and the press, subject to definition of those terms; and consideration of substantive due process will be appropriate only as to
state infringements of the liberty so defined.
Therefore, the crucial task with respect to state regulation is the
determination of the standard of substantive due process as it applies
to the freedom of expression. We may agree with Brandeis and
Holmes that the standard applied by the majorities in Gitlow and
Whitney was too lax; indeed, as Brandeis noted, 165 a higher due
process standard was being applied in the same period to infringements of economic rights. But the appropriate corrective of the
vices of Gitlow and Whitney was not the view tendered by Brandeis
and Holmes.166
Recently, we have witnessed a clumsy but definite admission of
due process considerations in a case involving state infringement of
asserted freedom of expression. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court
held that a state could define literature as obscene for minors, "at
least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors'
exposure to such material might be harmful." 167 The opinion is
clumsy because it attempts to be consistent with Roth and regards
the material rationally found harmful as therefore obscene and consequently, according to Roth, outside the scope of constitutional
protection. But the test of rationality for the state legislature's finding is distinctly a due process test, reminiscent of the holdings in
Gitlow and Whitney.
On the premise that comparison of the language of the first and
lar substantive standards in conscious due process adjudication, thereby rendering
false any pretense that substantive due process is an archaic or disreputable con•
ception. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 14 (1965), in which the Court observed:
"The requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of the
governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity for the
restriction."
164. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 261 (1961) (Justice Black, dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Justice Black,
dissenting).
165. See note 138 supra.
166. For an analysis of the appropriate due process standard for state infringements of the freedom of expression, see text accompanying notes 186-254 infra.
167. 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). See notes 68-77 supra and accompanying text.
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fourteenth amendments precludes treating the standards for state
and federal regulation of obscenity as identical, we may now proceed
to inquire what standards might govern each.
C. The Appropriate Scope of Federal Obscenity Control
We have already noted the uncertainty in the application of the
clear and present danger test and discussed the alternative implications for freedom of expression generally. 168 For purposes of federal
control of obscenity, however, it is not necessary to choose between
the alternative views. If the clear and present danger test is a qualification of the phrase "no law," leading to Justice Frankfurter's approach of balancing competing interests, an interest of the federal
government must be found to place on the scale; and if the test is
viewed as defining the freedoms of speech and of the press, it permits suppression only when the impending evil is, in Justice Holmes'
words, one "that Congress has a right to prevent." 169 It is difficult
to conceive of any evil which even the most patently offensive,
prurient, and worthless material might in good faith be said to
cause-that is an evil which the federal government is constitutionally empowered to prevent.
In the obscenity cases decided since Roth, no Justice has attempted to explain the constitutional right of Congress to prevent
whatever evils might be thought to be caused by obscenity; since
obscenity was held to be per se outside protected expression, it could
be suppressed. without any such explanation. But if obscenity is now
to be viewed in the same manner as other speech, it is difficult to
discern a federal interest that could justify suppression by the national government. Even Justice Harlan, who from the first has
rejected the Roth test and urged a minimum role for federal censorship, has never explained what constitutional basis exists for
federal suppression even of hard-core pornography.17°
It is by now a familiar and orthodox doctrine that Congress
may use its enumerated powers as means to accomplish extraneous
ends, 171 just as it may use extraneous measures as means to accom168. See text accompanying notes 137-48 supra.
169. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
170. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
171. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903). In fact, Congress may have extraneous unespoused objectives in
mind when it enacts legislation "necessary and proper" to the accomplishment of
some espoused constitutional end. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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plish ends specifically entrusted to it by the Constitution.172 Congress
may, for example, use its postal or commerce power to support
regulations designed to protect morals. 173 But when such regulations
abridge the freedom of expression, they threaten collision with the
first amendment; and such a collision can be avoided only if the
expression presents a sufficient risk of a consequence that Congress
has a right to prevent. Now, can we say that, because Congress may
use its postal or commerce power as a means to regulate morals, it
has a general right to regulate morals? Congress may outlaw the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, 174 thus
exercising its commerce power to control prostitution; has Congress,
then, a general power to control prostitution, so that federal law
could punish a strictly local prostitute admitted to have no connection with or effect upon interstate commerce? Congress may use
enumerated power A to advance extraneous objective B; does
this mean, not merely that Congress has power to advance B by
means of A, but rather that Congress has the general power to
advance B, so that the necessary and proper clause empowers Congress to employ other extraneous means to accomplish more effectively the extraneous objective B? Such a "bootstrap" view of
federal power has never been sustained, except by implication in one
case, 175 and in that case, it was sustained through failure in analysis
of the precedents rather than by deliberate decision. 176 Such a view
172. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819). Moreover, it is for Congress to choose the means, provided only that it have
a rational basis for its choice. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
173. E.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
174. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). See also Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
175. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); cf. United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 774·86 (1966) (separate opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas). If § 5 of the fourteenth amendment were viewed as
empowering Congress to provide against only state action, the objective, however,
being to secure the enjoyment of equal rights, then federal legislation against private
interference with such enjoyment could not be sustained except by the "bootstrap"
reasoning. Brennan, to avoid that impasse, reasoned that the fourteenth amendment
"secured" the rights generally, although it specifically proscribed only state inter•
ference with them. Under this reasoning, federal legislation outlawing private interference with the enjoyment of the secured rights was not a means of better accomplishing the e.xtraneous end which the amendment itself was only a partial means
of accomplishing, but rather was a means of accomplishing the end specifically
"secured" by the amendment's first section itself.
176. In Sullivan, the Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
[21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1946)] could be constitutionally applied to an act of misbranding drugs which had once crossed state lines even though a subsequent intrastate
transaction had intervened, and even though there was no suggestion that the local
misconduct had any effect upon interstate commerce. 332 U.S. at 697-98. For au-
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would, of course, render the federal government virtually omnicompetent, obliterating all the extant boundaries between state and
federal power.
The same illogic necessary to sustain such bootstrap omnicompetence would be necessary to sustain federal obscenity legislation
under even the broadest interpretation of the clear and present
danger test. Like the language of the necessary and proper clause,
the evil "that Congress has a right to prevent" 177 must contemplate,
not extraneous objectives at which Congress may aim the exercise of
its constitutional powers, but objectives constitutionally entrusted
to the care of the federal government. It follows that, even if it were
proved that the publication or distribution of obscenity would immediately and incontestably result in illicit behavior or would reduce every citizen to a dissolute, lecherous, Oedipal ·wretch, federal
obscenity controls could not be sustained; for these are not evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.
There is, however, a limited role for federal law regarding obscenity, which may be constitutionally supported. Congress should
have power to prohibit mailing or interstate shipment of materials
to any person who objects to such materials. 178 This power, which
thority the Court cited McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), a case that is
clearly distinguishable. In McDermott, the federal law prohibited the interstate shipment of syrup not bearing certain labelling, and contained a provision permitting
the government to enforce that regulation by inspection of the product after delivery.
The Court held that the enforcement provision was constitutional under the necessary and proper clause, and that a state law interfering with that means of enforcement had been pre-empted. The inspection provision was a means to the end of
regulating commerce, and the fact that the commercial regulation was itself a means
to the extraneous end of consumer protection was irrelevant. In Sullivan, however,
the Court's holding was completely different. There an act of misbranding after shipment in interstate commerce was held to be reachable by the federal act, not because
the reach of the act was necessary and proper to prevent the misbranding of goods
in interstate commerce, but because it was necessary in order to. accomplish the extraneous objective at which the regulation of interstate commerce was aimed-namely,
consumer protection.
Congress quickly took advantage of Sullivan's unprecedented holding, and amended
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in order to make unambiguous its intention to
reach as far as the Court had held that it could. Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 582.
See Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food
and Drug Laws, 14 J. PUB. L. 276, 292 n.90 (1965).
The reach of the federal law sustained in Sullivan could arguably have been sustained on the ground that intrastate transactions in drugs have an effect on interstate
commerce. But that was not the ground articulated in Sullivan; in its endorsement
of the "bootstrap" theory of federal power, Sullivan is clearly anomalous.
177. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
178. A federal statute authorizes the Postmaster General, upon request by an
addressee who has received advertisements offering for sale materials that the addressee "in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative," to issue an order forbidding further mailings of such advertisements to that
addressee. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). A recent case upheld the consti-

220

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:185

should not be limited to obscene materials but should apply equally
to all materials,179 might be justified on either of two grounds. The
better ground, in this ·writer's judgment, is the argument that the
freedoms of speech and press, by definition, do not encompass any
right to impose expression upon an unwilling audience. 180 Thus,
federal regulations which do not categorically exclude obscene materials from interstate commerce or the mails, but prohibit only their
mailing or shipment to unwilling recipients, would in no way infringe the freedoms of speech and press.
There is, however, another arguable ground for the same conclusion. There is clearly emerging a broad constitutional right of
privacy, of particular vigor when it protects a person in his own
home. 181 Since this right is included in fourteenth amendment "liberty," the fifth section of that amendment empowers Congress to
buttress the right "by appropriate legislation." If the authority of
Congress under this enforcement section is read-as several members
of the Court in 1966 seemed prepared to read it182-broadly enough
to empower Congress to reach private as well as state action interfering with fourteenth amendment liberty, Congress could act to
protect rights of privacy by outlawing unsolicited mailings or other
presentations of obscenity to a person in his home or other private
place. Such legislation would stand, not as a regulation of the mails
or of commerce, but as a means to achieve an end that Congress is
constitutionally empowered to achieve: the protection of privacy.
tutionality of that statute. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D.
Cal. 1969). The Court in that case held that § 4009 violated neither the fifth amendment's due process clause nor the first amendment's guarantees of free speech and
free press. It also found that the section was not void for vagueness, and that it did
not constitute an unlawful delegation of power. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court, and is docketed for argument during the present term. 38 U.S.L.W.
3097 CTuly 28, 1969) (No. 399).
Another limited role for federal law-but one containing great potential for abuse
-is in the regulation of the broadcasting industry. Not only is the viewer or listener
in a position that makes him vulnerable to unsolicited offense, but the broadcasting
industry enjoys a governmentally conferred status comparable to monopoly, and thus
broadcasting is unlike ordinary speech. As the Court recently stated: " •.. differences
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." R:ed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
179. The rationale which would legitimate the exercise of such power should
apply regardless of the type of materials to which the recipient objects. Thus third
class bulk mail-commonly referred to as "junk mail"-should be subject to the
same congressional restraint as obscene materials.
180. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949).
181. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
182. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 CTustice Clark, joined by Justices Black
and Fortas, concurring), 777-80 CTustice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Douglas, concurring) (1966).
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The latter argument, however, depends entirely upon acceptance
of the proposition that congressional power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment extends to the proscription of nonstate
invasions of liberty. Desirable as such a power might be, it is not clear
that the amendment confers it. Three of those Justices who in 1966
opined that it does-Justices Brennan and Douglas and Chief Justice
·warren-did so by an argument to the logic of which this writer
must demur; 183 and only two of them now remain on the Court.
Three other Justices-Clark, Black, and Fortas-offered no supporting argument, but merely proclaimed their conclusion; 184 and
only one of them now remains on the Court. The opinion of the
Court specifically reserved the question for future disposition.185
Consequently, this writer prefers to rest the power to prevent the
unsolicited mailing or interstate shipment of materials to any person
to whom they are objectionable upon definition of the freedoms of
speech and the press, rather than upon section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
D. The Appropriate Scope of State Obscenity Control

Since the liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment, so far
as it relates to speech and the press, is to be defined by reference to
the first amendment, 186 the clear and present danger test which applies in the case of federal suppression is applicable also in the case
of state suppression. However, while that test in this writer's judgment leaves no room for general federal obscenity laws,187 the same
test does leave open the possibility of state controls. Although the
possible effects of obscenity are consequences Congress has no constitutional right to prevent, the tradition of state police powers is
broad enough that the states do have the right to prevent at least
certain of the consequences which obscene materials might be shown
to cause. Thus, for example, if the states are admitted to have power
to prevent acts of criminal sexuality, and if certain materials can be
183. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 777-80 (1966); note 175 supra.
184. "[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state actionthat interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 383 U.S. at 762 Oustice Clark,
joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurring).
185. 383 U.S. at 755 (1966). However, Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's
opinion in Guest, observed in a later concurring opinion that only Justice Harlan
dissented from Guest's "square holding" that the right to travel involved in Guest
was assertable against private action. Shapiro v. New York, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43 & n.3
(1969) Oustice Stewart, concurring).
186. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
187. See text accompanying notes 171-76 supra.
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shown to create a clear and present danger of such acts being perpetrated, state suppression of those materials would be constitutional.
Application of the clear and present danger test, however, only
partially completes the task of delineating the power of the states
over expression. As pointed out above,1 88 the language of the fourteenth amendment contemplates some scope for state regulation even
of expression which is protected. Indeed, the limits on infringements
of protected expression are more important to obscenity control
than is the definition of what is and is not protected, for until the
scientific evidence becomes considerably more conclusive,189 proof
of a clear and present danger inherent in obscenity would seem to
be foreclosed.
The standard which the due process clause imposes for state action outside the judicial arena has been the subject of litigation
since the first decade after passage of the fourteenth amendment.100
Most of the cases have involved state regulations of business and
economic affairs. As is well known, the due process standard which
today is enforced against state economic regulations is rooted in the
holding of Nebbia v. New York that "the guarantee of due process ... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." 191 In
accord with the approach of Nebbia, it has been held that "regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community is due process." 192 It is clear that the
particular regulation chosen by the legislature need not be the best
possible means of dealing with a particular problem: "[i]t is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it." 193 Not only has the due process test for state economic
regulations become one of the mere rationality of the legislation's
188. See text accompanying notes 150-55 supra.
189. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968). The Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography, created by Act of Oct. 3, 1967, 81 Stat. 253, and scheduled
to repon to the President and Congress by July 30, 1970, was charged, among other
duties, with studying the effects of obscenity and its relationship to antisocial behavior.
190. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
191. 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
192. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
193. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). See also Note, Michigan Statute Requiring Motorcyclists To Wear Protective Helmets Held Unconstitutional, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 360 (1968).
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relationship to a legitimate end; the Court has gone so far in deferring to the legislature's finding of a rational relationship that in one
recent case Justice Harlan was obliged to concur separately "on the
ground that this state measure [apparently on Harlan's independent
determination] bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective."194 The due process standard thus enforced
against state economic regulations is comparable to the standard
which the Court enforces in the case of congressional legislation
under the necessary and proper clause, especially with respect to
interstate commerce. In such cases, the Court has left the question
whether a particular activity affects commerce, so as to be regulable
under the necessary and proper clause, to decision by Congress,. reserving to itself the power of further examination only to determine
whether or not there is a rational basis for the congressional finding.lllts
However, the restraints placed upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment may change with variations in subject matter. This fact
is well established with respect to the equal protection clause. The
Court has deemed that economic regulation is permissible under
that clause if a legislative classification "has relation to the purpose
for which it is made...." 196 The Court stated in 1961: "[a] statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it...." 197 In only one modern case of economic regulation has the Supreme Court found a statutory classification so remote from the purpose of the act as to offend the equal
protection clause. 198 Racial classifications, however, fare differently
under that clause. A statutory discrimination based on race "will be
upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." 199 The special
treatment accorded racial classifications under the equal protection
clause is justified by the fact that equality of treatment of the races
was the overriding objective of the fourteenth amendment. But with
regard to classifications affecting highly valued rights other than
racial equality, the Supreme Court has been considerably more
ready to find violations of the equal protection clause than it has
194. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (concurring opinion), citing
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
195. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
196. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
197. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
198. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
199. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967).
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with regard to economic regulations. 200 Whether or not the freedom
of speech is regarded as occupying a "preferred position" in our
jurisprudence, it is certainly true that our system and traditions
place an extremely high value upon this freedom; and it would seem
that, when the fourteenth amendment is applied to matters beyond
the racial problems with which it immediately dealt, the due process
clause, like the equal protection clause, must take account of the
different values to be placed upon the several liberties which might
be at stake.
The original doctrine of substantive due process is receptive to
distinctions in the degree of protection afforded to liberties of different values. While it was foreshadowed in earlier cases decided
under the fifth amendment, 201 the doctrine of substantive due process did not flower until after enactment of the fourteenth amendment. At first, in Munn v. Illinois, 202 a case of economic regulation,
infringements of property rights were justified under the due process
clause by a holding that "[w]hen ... one devotes his property to a
use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good ...." 203 The Court then held that
regulation of charges for the use of such property was not a violation of the due process clause so long as the legislature considered
that regulation reasonable.
But a different standard was soon proclaimed for more highly
valued rights. In Hurtado v. California, 204 decided in 1884, the
Court distinguished the American due process clause from comparable guarantees which had long been established in England:
The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as
guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security
against their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the
power of Parliament; so that bills of attainder ... and other arbitrary
acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history, were
never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land . . .. The
200. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 458 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 655 CTustice
Harlan, dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
202. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
203. 94 U.S. at 126.
204. ll0 U.S. 516 (1884).
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actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative
tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the
Commons.
In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to
protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachments of power delegated to their governments . . . . They were
limitations upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as
executive and judicial.
... Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also against
arbitrary legislation; but, in that application ... they must be held
to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.
. . . [I]t is not to be supposed that these legislative powers are
absolute and despotic, and that the amendment prescribing due
process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical
restraint.... The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process
is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of
individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers,
as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of
lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the
force of the government.205
'While this general language, indicating that the Court must determine arbitrariness or reasonableness, makes no distinction among
the several rights and liberties thus protected, the case involved the
process by which a man could be deprived of his life, a most highly
valued right; and the lvfunn case, which had been decided only
seven years before and which had allowed the legislature to decide
the reasonableness of economic regulations, was not specifically impugned.
Very soon thereafter, however, the Court began to usurp the
legislative function it had declined in Munn with respect to economic regulations. From 1890 onward,206 the Court invalidated
scores of measures of social and economic regulation on grounds that
they infringed property rights and economic liberties in a manner
the Court thought unreasonable, and hence violative of substantive
due process. Curiously, during this same period, while the economic
cases were decided inconsistently with Munn and the Court took
to itself the question of the reasonableness of economic regulations,
the Court reneged on Hurtado in cases involving personal rights.
Thus, in Gitlow and Whitney the Court virtually abdicated its role
as assessor of the reasonableness of infringements of rights of expres205. llO U.S. at 531-32, 535-36.
206. Minnesota Rate Case, 1!14 U.S. 418 (1890).
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sion and deferred to the judgment of the legislators on that matter.207 The reason for this curious inversion of the original doctrine
is not obscure: the majority of Justices during that era placed a high
value on economic rights, and felt more concern over their infringement than over the suppression of dissidents' speech.
Since 1934,208 substantive due process with regard to economic
rights has returned to the original doctrine propounded in Munn,
leaving the reasonableness of economic regulations to be determined
by the legislature.209 In overreaction against the obstructionist abuses
of economic substantive due process, however, the baby has been
thrown out with the bath. Rather than recognize the receptivity of
the historic conception of substantive due process to differences in
the value of the rights it protects, the Court has declined to confess
that it continues to deal with infringements of rights of expression
in traditional substantive due process terms. Thus, while declining
to identify its deliberations as assessments of substantive due process,
it has applied them indiscriminately to federal as well as state casesunder the first as well as the fourteenth amendment. Thus, not only
is it feasible to deal with state control of expression in historic substantive due process terms, without the compulsion to apply the
"minimum rationality" test of the economic cases; but the Court
has consistently been employing just such an analysis, 210 although
without admitting the characterization and therefore without confining its essentially due process judgments to cases of state regulation.
Historic substantive due process doctrine requires a sufficient relationship between a regulation and a legitimate state objective; in
the absence of that relationship the regulation is arbitrary and thus
impermissible. 211 The doctrine also entrusts to the Court the protection of "the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and
property,"212 to prevent violations of "the essential attributes of that
liberty,"213 while at the same time recognizing that these liberties are
not absolute and must be subject to some regulation to accommodate
competing legitimate state interests.214 Thus, application of a sub201. See text accompanying notes 108-13 supra.
208. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
209. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
210. See notes 159-62 supra.
211. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 502-25 (1934).
212. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
213. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
214. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877).
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stantive due process test unavoidably involves the exercise of judgment. There is no solace here for those who insist that the guarantees
against state infringements of liberty are "absolutes." But, as commentators have demonstrated, even the absolutists indulge in balancing when they determine what is the right that is "absolutely" protected and what does and does not constitute an infringement.215 As
one commentator has stated: "[a]ll judges balance competing interests in deciding constitutional questions-even those who most
vigorously deny their willingness to do so."216 Resort to absolutes
gives a sense of immutability and transcendency to constitutional
adjudication, but it is a false sense.217 The function of law is not to
eliminate judgment, but, by structuring the questions for decision,
to confine it within narrow bounds. Thus, one apologist for the
absolutist approach to first amendment liberties has answered its
critics by pointing out that "[t]his approach of 'defining' rather than
'balancing' narrows and structures the issue for the Court, bringing
it more readily within the bounds of judicial procedures." 218 We
have endorsed that approach to the first amendment, but found that
it cannot apply equally to the fourteenth amendment because of
the latter's due process clause.219 However, we can accomplish the
same objective of narrowing and structuring the issue for the Court
215. See, e.g., P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION ll4-17 (1962).
216. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75,
79-80 (1960).
217. "[T]o remove candor from one's description of the decisional process is to
strike at the heart of the rule of law. • • • [A]bsolutists risk the independence of
the judiciary by den}ing their basic judicial responsibility, which is to exercise judgment." Karst, supra note 216, at 80.
218. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 914-15 (1963) (quoted in context in text accompanying note 137 supra).
219. Justice Douglas himself, joined by Justice Black, has indicated the possible
consequences for state obscenity legislation if the fourteenth amendment restrictions
on the state are viewed as distinct from the restrictions which the first amendment
places on Congress. Dissenting in Ginsberg, Douglas wrote, "If we were in the field
of substantive due process and seeking to measure the propriety of state law by the
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, I suppose there would be no difficulty under our decisions in sustaining this act." 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968). Indeed, Douglas sees
no reason, if what he calls "substantive due process" is to be the test, why legislatures
should be limited to protecting only children: "If rationality is the measure of the
validity of this law, then I can see how modem Anthony Coinstocks could make out a
case for 'protecting' many groups in our society, not merely children." 390 U.S. at 655.
Concurring in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 703-04 (1968),
Douglas, again joined by Justice Black, stated: "If we assume arguendo that the censorship of obscene publications, whether for children or for adults, is in the area of substantive due process, the States have a very wide range indeed for determining what
kind of movie, novel, poem, or article is harmful.'' But Douglas and Black have too
narrow a view of the scope of substantive due process. Under a substantive due process standard, there is still a great deal of restraint on state obscenity control. See
text accompanying notes 220-54 infra.
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by a careful assemblage of the considerations appropriate under the
due process clause. The exercise of judgment upon each of the factors
in the context of particular cases and issues is a task for judges, not
professors; but to aid in defining the factors to narrow and structure
the questions for judgment is a task not only for judges, but for
professors and all students of our constitutional system.
It bears repeating that the question before us concerns the requirements of fourteenth amendment substantive due process-a
separate question from that addressed by the clear and present
danger test. That test defines the liberty protected; we are here concerned with the standards for state infringement of liberty admitted
to be protected. However, some of the factors involved in the clear
and present danger test are factors which also are relevant here.
Recognition of differences in the values we attach to property rights
and various liberties requires that we recognize the elements of the
due process test as variables, so that the test operates as a framework
for structuring judgment and not as a wooden "hornbook" rule. It
seems to this writer that four factors must be considered in judging
the validity of state infringements of liberty under a substantive due
process test: the legitimacy of the state's interest, or the constitutional permissibility of the end to which the regulation is claimed to
be related; the substantiality of the legitimate state interest; the
means-to-end relationship between a particular piece of legislation
and the legitimate state interest; and the effect of countervailing
interests. These factors will now be examined more closely insofar as
they bear directly on the state's control of obscenity.
l. The Legitimacy of the State Interest

Before reaching the question whether particular legislation is
sufficiently related to an objective, it must be determined whether
the objective itself is within the constitutional power of a state. Certainly a state has power to prevent acts of violence, including sexual
violence and sexual assaults upon unwilling persons, young or old.
Perhaps the states must also be admitted the power to insure the
mental health and proper social adjustment of their youth, even
though these spongy concepts are highly relative. But the enforcement of traditional or contemporary moral standards of sexual behavior among consenting adults is a matter which has already been
put in some question220 and on which continuing developments can
220. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, :!60 U.S. 684
(1959).

December 1969]

Requiem for Roth

229

be anticipated. Moreover, the legitimacy of a state's interest in what
transpires in the privacy of one's own home has been put in serious
question. 221 Thus, statutes designed to protect the citizenry from
violence that could result from the spread of obscenity and those
designed to protect the youth of a state from the corruption of obscenity have as their goal a legitimate state interest; and unless those
statutes are impermissible under one of the other three £actors, they
may constitutionally interfere with free expression. But the state may
not enact legislation which has as an objective the protection of
adults from themselves.
The above limitations on the power of states to regulate are
easily applied to the regulation of speech and of published materials.
But when nonverbal expression, such as various forms of action and
of dramatic communication, is at issue, the legitimacy of the state
interest in regulation is much more difficult to appraise. Earlier in
our history, it was held that the requirement of due process imposed
no restraints on indirect or consequential infringements of property
or liberty. 222 Today, however, expression by means of nonverbal
action deserves and receives constitutional protection, but not every
action is protected merely because it is labelled expressive. The
Court has held that regulation of action, however expressive,
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.223
For purposes of federal regulation that test may be formulated in
terms of a definition of the freedoms protected by the first amendment, but the same considerations would be pertinent in judging
state regulations by the standard of due process. Indeed, although
the language quoted above is taken from a case involving a federal
regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards, the Court in
another recent case applied a similar test to a local regulation.224
221. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
222. "[fhe fifth amendment due process] provision has always been understood as
referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting
from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing
upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals." Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871).
223. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
224. Tinker v. Des l\foines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
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That case was concerned with a school regulation prohibiting a form
of expression which presented the possibility of disruption of school
decorum, but which, unlike the draft card destruction, did not interfere with any other state interest. In applying an interest balancing test, the Court held that the state's interest in school decorum
was insufficient to justify the regulation. 225 Thus, the legitimacy of
the state's interest in preventing the forbidden action may be admitted, but the substantiality of that interest must be determined
and weighed against its effect on the freedom of expression.
The same approach seems appropriate for dealing with live
dramatic expression. Some modern theatrical productions involve
kinds of behavior which states have traditionally had the power to
punish; but the legitimate state interest in regulating behavior
should not be sufficient in itself to justify prosecution of performers
in such productions. Rather, the substantiality of the state's interest
must be weighed along with the other factors involved in questions
of freedom of expression.
It has already been noted that the right of privacy is gaining increasing constitutional stature.226 State legislation whose purpose is
the protection rather than invasion of one's privacy would seem
to have a legitimate objective. Protection of citizens from being
subjected unwillingly or unwittingly to offensive expression seems
to be a legitimate state interest. Pursuant to this interest, a state
might, for example, prohibit distribution of unsolicited obscenity
by mail227 or any other means. 228
Such legislation, however, is to be distinguished from that which
would suppress expression that some persons might consider offensive. Nevertheless, there has been some case support for the
proposition that expression can be restrained solely because it is
offensive. In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,229 the Court construed
the Federal Comstock Act230 as requiring for conviction thereunder
225. 393 U.S. at 507-14.
226. See note 181 supra.
227. Even though the postal system is a federal instrumentality, such legislation
by the states should be valid unless deliberately pre-empted. For a discussion of the
doctrine of pre-emption, see Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: 11. Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws, 14 J. PUB. L. 276, 279-305 (1965). If there
were fears of unintended pre-emption, however, federal legislation could assuage the
fear by specifically authorizing state legislation. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946).
228. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
229. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The Act prohibits the mailing of obscene matter and
establishes criminal penalties for violation of its provisions.
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not only that the materials appeal to prurient interests, but also that
they be "deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current community standards of decency." 231 The statute, the Court held, "has
always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of
sex.''232 Manual Enterprises has been interpreted by adherents of the
Roth rationale as establishing "patent offensiveness" not only as an
additional statutory requirement under the Comstock Act, but as
an additional constitutional requirement for a finding of obscenity.
Thus, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, the second coalescing element
which Justice Brennan included in the definition of obscenity was
that "the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters.'' 233 In no other area of speech is the
mere offensiveness of an expression any justification for its suppression. Certainly, persons should be protected from the plight of having offensive utterances thrust upon them when they have no
opportunity for escape; 234 and there should be a limited restraint oi;i
speech which is so offensive as to provoke breaches of the peace.235
But expression may not be restrained solely on the ground that some
people regard it as unpatriotic or sacrilegious and thus as extremely
offensive.236 Similarly, if obscenity is not to be treated as a distinct
class of speech categorically excluded from constitutional protection, it seems difficult to justify its suppression merely because it
is very offensive to some, to many, or even to almost all "decent"
people.237 Of course, the patent offensiveness test under Roth and
231. 370 U.S. at 484.
232. 370 U.S. at 483.
233. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
234. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak,
!143 U.S. 451 (1952).
235. Feiner v. New York, !140 U.S. 315 (1951). Some cases have treated such speech
as outside the category of protected expression. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
236. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
l!4ll U.S. 495 (1952). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940).
2ll7. The offensiveness of obscenity, however, has been frequently decried. For
example, Mr. Richard H. Kuh of New York City, addressing the Third Circuit Judicial Conference in September 1966 quoted D.H. Lawrence's reference to pornography
as "the attempt to insult sex" and make it "[u]gly and cheap • • • degraded . • •
trivial and cheap and nasty." He then opined: "I think the ban on pandering which
markets an item, not for its beauty, not for its historical value, not for its classical
interest, but just for its cheapness and nastiness, is something that our society can
properly support." 42 F.R.D. 504, 513 (1968). A majority of the Supreme Court today
would probably approve prosecutions for such pandering even without the Roth test,
as Chief Justice Warren did in his concurring opinion in Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96
(1957). But to suppress the material itself, as distinguished from the act of pandering
that material, because it degrades and insults sex-as Kuh has urged at length in his
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its progeny is a criterion for excluding certain expression from constitutional protection; but with the demise of Roth it seems impossible to justify recognition of a legitimate state interest in protecting
the citizens' sensibilities with regard to sexual expression, just as
such an interest cannot be justified when religious or political expression is at issue. 238

2. The Substantiality of the Legitimate State Interest
Early in the development of the clear and present danger test,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis qualified the original formulation
from Schenck v. United States239 by urging that to justify suppression of speech, the evil consequence feared to ensue from that speech
should be serious or substantial.240 The substantiality of the legitimate interest sought to be protected should also be a factor in determining the constitutionality, under the due process clause, of
state suppression of obscenity. The state may have a more substantial
interest in protecting children from the possible consequences of
obscenity than it has in so protecting adults. Similarly, the state
may have a more substantial interest in preventing sexual "perverbook Foolish Fig-Leaves? Pornography in-and Out of-Court (1967)-would be as unconstitutional as to suppress sacrilege or verbal aspersions of the flag.
238. Another aspect of Roth is equally unsound. In the course of his argument in
the Court's opinion in Roth, Justice Brennan stated:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people...• All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees.
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). It was in this context that Brennan found that "implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. at 484. Thus, Roth may be read to mean that
obscenity is unprotected since it is not a part of any dialogue concerning political and
social questions. In the first place, that conclusion is simply untrue. Obscenity may at
times fulfill the same role with respect to unorthodox conceptions of social relations
and morality that satire fulfills with respect to other kinds of social criticism. In fact,
it may even heighten the impact of social criticism through the eloquence of shock.
But aside from this fact, to confine liberty of expression in the way that Brennan's
proposition does, would exclude from protection a large variety of innocuous, but
pointless, communication. A great deal of expression has as its purpose mere entertainment, and the suppression of such expression would not be tolerated despite any
attempts to justify the suppression on the ground that only the "interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes" is protected. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that various publications which contained "nothing of any
possible value to society" were nonetheless protected: "The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right."
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Expression concerning sex should be
afforded the same degree of freedom under the first and fourteenth amendments as
is expression concerning any other subject, because "the rights of free speech and a
free press are not confined to any field of human interest." Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
239. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
240. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 377 (1927).
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sion" than it has in denying entertainment to those deemed to be
already "perverted." Substantially, however, cannot be considered in
isolation. It varies in relation to the weight accorded countervailing
interests, 241 and in turn affects the degree of relationship which
should be required between the liberty-infringing means and the
legitimate end sought to be attained.

3. The Means-to-End Relationship Between a Particular Piece of
Legislation and the Legitimate State Interest
In Dennis v. United States,242 Chief Justice Vinson and the three
Justices who joined in his opinion243 endorsed Judge Learned Hand's
reformulation of the clear and present danger test under the first
amendment: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of
the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 244 Opinions may
differ on the question whether that reformulation is too great a compromise of the protection which the first amendment affords against
federal suppression. But as an element of the due process test that
governs state suppression of obscenity, such a formula makes possible
an accommodation benveen those who fear the dire consequences of
obscenity and those who note the inconclusiveness of the scientific
evidence as to its harmfulness. Judge Hand's statement suggests that
if the evil feared is very great, a lesser showing of its probability
should be sufficient for suppression than if the evil feared is small.
Applied in the case of obscenity, this approach would mean that a
relatively insubstantial state interest could justify suppression only
if the damage to that interest is highly probable to follow from the
publication or circulation of obscenity. On the other hand, if the
potential evil were much greater-that is, if the state's interest
in preventing the evil were very substantial-the obscenity would be
suppressible on a lesser showing of probability that it would cause
the evil. In the field of economic regulation, the very substantial
state interest in controlling economic forces justifies infringements
of property rights and freedom of contract on a showing of minimum
rationality in the relationship of regulatory means to the end. While
there is no necessity to apply that same lax standard to other areas,
as the Court did in Ginsberg v. New York, 245 the greater sub241. See text accompanying notes 247-54 infra.
242. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
243. These were Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.
244. 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting from the opinion below, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950).
245. 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968); see text accompanying notes 65-77 supra.

234

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:185

stantiality of the state interest at stake in protecting its children
would justify upholding the suppression of the distribution of obscene materials to minors on a lesser showing of the probability of
a cause and effect relationship than should be required in the case of
distribution to adults.
The over-sufficiency of the means for the accomplishment of the
end must also be considered with respect to the relationship of suppressive legislation to the asserted state interest. Even the most
substantial state interest should not justify legislation which aids in
the protection of that interest, but does far more than is necessary to
protect it. The overbroad statute, in obscenity cases as elsewhere, is
violative of the due process clause.246
4.

The Effect of Countervailing Interests

The clearest and most immediate relationship between an utterance and an evil that a state has a substantial and legitimate interest in preventing would not justify punishment of the speaker
without a fair trial. Similarly, other countervailing interests might
outweigh an interest which would be served by suppression.247
Stanley v. Georgia, for example, recognized that the right of a person
to read or observe what he pleases in the privacy of his own home is
an interest in competition with a state's interest in the control of
obscenity.248 The right of parents to control the upbringing of their
children is also a substantial interest, which may compete with state
interests that might be served by obscenity control. However, the
interest in parental authority might not be given such weight as to
prevent prosecution of a parent who deliberately "depraves" his
child with pornography, assuming a substantial state interest in
preventing such "depravity," any more than it prevents prosecution
of a parent who seduces or otherwise physically abuses his child. 249
The greatest interest to be weighed against any state interest
claimed to justify state suppression of expression, however, is the
interest of a free people in the freedom of speech itself. This is the
246. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, !!IO U.S. 88
(1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The problem of vagueness presents a different issue. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). A law may
establish a sufficiently ascertained standard of guilt, and thus avoid the procedural
due process vice of vagueness, and yet be so broad in its reach that it inhibits actions
which, on consideration appropriate under substantive due process, may not be so
inhibited.
247. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
248. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See text accompanying notes 79-92 supra. However, the
Court in Stanley did not regard that privacy interest as absolutely controlling or as
controlling in all circumstances. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
249. Cf. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947).
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point that was emphasized by the Court in Hurtado and Near: the
Court must protect "the very substance" 250 of this liberty and must
repel any invasion of its "essential attributes." 251 We are thus
referred to the history and purpose of the constitutional guaranty,
most eloquently stated by Justice Brandeis252 and in our own day by
Justice Douglas.253 Furthermore, even measures which otherwise
would be permissible will violate substantive due process if, while
suppressing the constitutionally suppressible, they also intimidate
unsuppressible expression.254

Ill.

CONCLUSION

Since the cases seem to indicate that the regime of Roth has
ended, it is important to determine what approach will arise to replace it. This Article has, through an analysis of existing constitutional law, suggested a possible approach. According to that approach, obscene expression should be treated no differently from
nonobscene expression, and the only important matter for examination is the application of familiar constitutional standards to the
particular dangers posed by obscenity.
Since the legitimate federal interest in regulating obscenity is
extremely limited, the primary concern of this Article has been an
examination of the bases of permissible state regulation. The proposed framework for decision on state legislation is not a new structure, but is the familiar substantive due process standard, detailed
with new precision. That framework will not by itself decide any
state obscenity case. It is only a skeleton to which flesh must be added
gradually by judicial decision. The legitimacy of certain state interests, their substantiality, the means-to-end relationship between
particular legislation and legitimate interests, and the effects of
countervailing interests must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Each of these determinations will call for the exercise of judgment,
with its inevitable subjective component; none involves absolutes.
Moreover, it may be admitted that the factors treated here as distinct
coalesce in reality. But this suggested framework for deliberation,
while keeping faith with the language of the Constitution, does
serve the purpose of narrowing and structuring the issues for decision by the Court.
250. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
251. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
252. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion).
253. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
254. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959). See also note 158 supra.
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I£ decisions are made within that framework, any degree of
strictures upon state control of obscenity could ultimately be imposed, and different degrees of restraint could be imposed for various situations. Thus, some types of legislation might be permissible
if they can be shown to have any rational connection to a legitimate
state objective, while other types of legislation might require a
cogent demonstration of a demonstrable risk to an urgent state interest. I£ I were in a position to judge, I would be inclined to give
as much weight as Justice Douglas does 255 to the interest of society
in free expression; but I would permit restraints designed to protect
rights of privacy, and I would accept regulation for the insulation of
children from obscenity, although my test for accepting such regulation would not be quite so lax as the minimum rationality test endorsed in Ginsberg v. New York. 256 Being a professor, and not a
judge, however, I am content to suggest the factors to be weighed
for decision, and to leave the judgment to those who have been assigned that task.
The effect of employing the suggested framework for decision,
therefore, would not be to dictate the end product of constitutional
doctrine regarding state regulation of obscenity. But employing this
structure of the relevant factors would help to eliminate the ad hoc
and episodic, the knee-jerk and "gut reaction" elements of obscenity law frequently decried under the regime of Roth. Moreover,
since it provides for the treatment of obscenity as expression protected as much as, but no more than, any other class of speech, it
would relieve the Supreme Court of the politically sensitive task of
deciding case by case the obscenity vel non of all types of sordid
publications. Thus, it would not preclude the development of uniform constitutional standards but would put the Court in its rightful
position of formulating such general standards rather than passing on
particular publications one by one.
The controversy surrounding the Court today is furious enough
without the public reaction to what laymen can understand only as
the Justices' own moral evaluation of salacious publications. We
should hope that public hostility will never deter the Justices of the
Supreme Court from fulfilling their constitutional duty, as their
oath and conscience demand. But the existence of public reaction
to constitutional doctrine heightens the importance of developing
constitutional law in such a way that, in appearance as well as in
substance, the principles and rules of law developed are generally
applicable and are, so far as possible, objective or neutral.
255. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
256. 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968). See text accompanying notes 65-77 supra.

